Abstract-In 1951, K. J. Arrow proved that, under certain assumptions, it is impossible to have group decision making rules which satisfy reasonable conditions like symmetry. This Impossibility Theorem is often cited as a proof that reasonable group decision making is impossible.
Indeed, Arrow's result assumes that the only information we have about individual preferences is their binary ("yes"-"no") preferences between the alternatives. This information does not fully describe a persons' preferences: e.g., the same preference A 1 A 2 A 3 may indicate that a person strongly prefers A 1 to A 2 , and A 2 to A 3 , and it may also indicate that this person strongly prefers A 1 to A 2 , and at the same time, A 2 is almost of the same quality as A 3 .
To describe this degree of preference, researchers in decision making use the notion of utility; see, e.g., [22] , [23] .
What is utility: a reminder. A person's rational decisions are based on the relative values to the person of different outcomes. In financial applications, the value is usually measured in monetary units such as dollars. However, the same monetary amount may have different values for different people: e.g., a single dollar is likely to have more value to a poor person than to a rich one. In view of this difference, in decision theory, to describe the relative values of different outcomes, researchers use a special utility scale instead of the more traditional monetary scales.
There are many different ways to elicit utility from decision makers. A common approach is based on preferences of a decision maker among lotteries. A simple way to define a lottery is as follows. Take a very undesirable outcome A − and a very desirable outcome A + , and then consider the lottery A(p) in which we get A + with probability p and A − with probability 1 − p (p is given and is usually understood as an "objective" probability). Clearly, the larger p, the more preferable A(p): p < p implies A(p) < A(p ). Traditional decision theory is based on assumptions concerning preferences over lotteries. For example, the following two assumptions are usually adopted as axioms:
• the comparison amongst lotteries is a linear order -i.e., a person can always select one of the two alternatives, and • the comparison is Archimedean -i.e. if for all ε > 0, an outcome B is better than A(p − ε) and worse than
A(p+ε), then it is of the same quality as A(p): B ∼ A(p)
(where A ∼ B means that A and B are of the same quality). Because of our selection of A − and A + , most reasonable outcomes are better than A − = A(0) and worse than A + =
A(1). Due to linearity, for every p, either A(p) < B, or B ∼ A(p), or B < A(p). If we define the utility of outcome B as u(B) def

= sup{p | A(p) < B}, we have A(u(B)−ε) < B and A(u(B)+ε) > B; thus, due to the Archimedean property, we have A(u(B)) ∼ B. This value u(B) is called the utility of the outcome B.
As defined above utility always takes values within the interval [0, 1]. It is also possible to define utility to take values within other intervals. Indeed, note that the numerical value u(B) of the utility depends on the choice of reference outcomes A − and A + . If we select a different pair of reference outcomes, then the resulting numerical utility value u (B) is different. The usual axioms of utility theory guarantee that two utility functions u(B) and u (B) corresponding to different choices of the reference pair are related by a linear transformation: u (B) = a · u(B) + b for some real numbers a > 0 and b. By using appropriate values a and b, we can then re-scale utilities to make the scale more convenient (e.g. in financial applications, closer to the monetary scale).
Expected utility. Often, we have a "branching" situation involving n incompatible events E 1 , . . . , E n with probabilities p 1 , . . . , p n such that exactly one of them will occur. E.g. coins can fall heads or tails, dice can show 1 to 6, etc. In such situations, for every n outcomes B 1 , . . . , B n , we can form a lottery by assigning outcome B i if event E i occurs. If we know the utility u i = u(B i ) of each outcome B i , and we know the probability p i = P (E i ) of each event E i , then the utility of the corresponding lottery may be determined as follows.
We know the probability p i of each event E i . Thus, the lottery "B i if E i " if equivalent to the lottery in which we get B i with probability p i . The fact that u(B i ) = u i means that each B i is equivalent to getting A + with probability u i and A − with probability 1 − u i . By replacing each B i with this new "lottery", we conclude that the lottery "if E i then B i " is equivalent to a two-step lottery in which we:
• first select E i with probability p i , and • then, for each i, select A + with probability u i and A − with the probability 1 − u i . In this two-step lottery, the probability of getting A + is equal to p 1 ·u 1 +. . .+p n ·u n (often this is obtained by adding suitable axioms on combination of lotteries, but the meaning should be intuitive here). Thus, by our definition of utility, the utility of the lottery "if
In mathematical terms, u is the expected value of the utility, so this approach is often called the expected utility approach.
In the traditional approach, between several alternatives we select the one with the largest utility u, hence the one with the largest value of the expected utility.
Nash's bargaining solution. So, for each participant P i , instead of knowing this participants' preferences, we can determine the utility u ij def = u i (A j ) of all the alternatives A 1 , . . . , A m . Once we know such utilities, we can ask the same question: how to transform these known utilities into a reasonable group decision rule?
The answer to this question was, in effect, provided by another future Nobelist John Nash who, in his 1950 paper [24] , has shown that under reasonable assumptions like symmetry, independence from irrelevant alternatives, and scale invariance (i.e., invariance under replacing the original utility function u i (A) with an equivalent function a · u i (A)), the only group decision rule is selecting an alternative A for which the product Here, the utility functions must be scaled in such a way that the "status quo" situation A (0) is assigned the utility 0. This rescaling can be achieved, e.g., by replacing the original utility values u i (A) with re-scaled values
For a more detailed discussion on Nash's bargaining solution and its application to group decision making, see, e.g., [18] , [22] , [23] , [26] .
It is easy to see that the Pareto condition and Independence condition are both satisfied for the Nash's solution. Let us start with the Pareto condition. If all participants prefer A j to A k , this means that
The Independence condition is even either to check: according to Nash's solution, we prefer
From this formula, once can easily see that the group ranking between A j and A k depends only on how participants rank A j and A k -and does not depend on how they rank other alternatives.
Comment. Nash's solution can be easily explained in terms of fuzzy logic (see, e.g., [17] , [29] : We want all participants to be happy, so we want the first participant to be happy and the second participant to be happy, etc. We can take u 1 (A) as the "degree of happiness" of the first participant, u 2 (A) as the "degree of happiness" of the second participant, etc. If, in order to formalize "and", we use the operation d · d (one of the two operations originally proposed by L. Zadeh to describe "and"), then the degree to which all n participants are satisfied is equal to the product u 1 (A)·u 2 (A)·. . .·u n (A). So, if we look for the alternative which leads to the largest possible degree of mutual satisfaction, then we must look for the alternative A for which the product u 1 (A) · u 2 (A) · . . . · u n (A) attains the largest possible value.
Potential applications. This idea can be applied to various problems ranging from global problems such as the division of a disputed territory [19] , [20] , [26] to more down-toEarth problems such as dividing a cake (or, in general, an inheritance). Many ingenious decisions of this problems are known; see, e.g., [7] , [8] , [12] , [13] , [31] ; our point is that Nash's solution can work as well.
III. HOW WE CAN DETERMINE UTILITIES
It is easy to determine, for each participants P i , his or her utility u ij of a given alternative A j with an arbitrary accuracy 2 −k . For example, we can use the iterative bisection method in which, at every step, we have an interval [u, u] that is guaranteed to contain the actual (unknown) value of the utility u.
As we have mentioned, in the standard scale, u ∈ −k which contains the actual value u -i.e., we have determined u with the accuracy 2 −k .
IV. WHAT IS THE GUARANTEE THAT PARTICIPANTS WILL PROVIDE CORRECT UTILITY VALUES?
Problem: sometimes it is beneficial to cheat. The above description relies on the fact that we can elicit true preferences (and hence, true utility functions) from the participants. However, sometimes, it is beneficial for a participant to cheat and provide false utility values. For example, if a participant P 1 know the utilities of all the other participants, then it is sometimes advantageous to supply false utility values. Indeed, as ideal situation for P 1 is when, out of m alternatives A 1 , . . . , A m , the group as a whole selects an alternative A m1 which is the best for P 1 , i.e, for which
It is not necessarily true that the product n i=1 u i (A j ) computed based on P 1 's true utility is the largest for the alternative A m 1 . However, we can force this product to attain the maximum for A m 1 if we report, e.g., a "fake" utility function u 1 (A) for which u 1 (A m 1 ) = 1 and u 1 (A j ) = 0 for all j = m 1 .
In case of uncertainty, cheating may hurt the cheater: an observation. In practice, we rarely encounter a situation in which one person is familiar with the preferences of all the others while others have no information about this person's preferences. Usually, if other participants have no information about this person's preferences, then this person has no information about the preferences of the others as well.
In this case, cheating may be disadvantageous. For example, if we report the above false utility function, then if others have similar utility functions with u i (A m i ) > 0 for some m i = m 1 and u i (A j ) = 0 for all other j, then for every alternative A j , Nash's product is equal to 0. From this viewpoint, all alternatives are equally good, so each of them can be chosen. In particular, it may be possible that the group selects an alternative A q which is the worst for P 1 -i.e., for which
On the other hand, by reporting the actual utility function, P 1 may lead to the selection of an alternative A k which is better than A q .
So, in this example, by reporting a false utility function u 1 (A j ) instead of the correct one u 1 (A j ), the participant P 1 may hurt himself by reducing his payoff from
Territorial division problem: a reminder. Let us show that in the reasonable case of dividing the territory, it is beneficial to report the correct utility values.
Comment. This result was partly announced in [19] , [20] .
In this case [26] , we have a set A to divide. Here, each alternative corresponds to a partition of the set A into n subsets
The utility functions have the form u i (X) = X v i (t) dt for given functions v i (t) from the set A to the set of nonnegative real numbers. Based on the utility functions v i (t), we find a partition X 1 , . . . , X n for which Nash's product u 1 (X) · . . . · u n (X n ) attains the largest possible value.
Without losing generality, let us concentrate on the actions of the first participant P 1 . Let us assume that v 1 (t) is the actual utility function of this participant. The participant P 1 can either report his/her actual function v 1 (t), or he/she can report a different utility function v 1 (t) = v 1 (t). For each reported function v 1 (t), we can find the partition X 1 , . . . , X n that maximizes the corresponding product
As a result, the participant P 1 gets the set X 1 , so its actual utility is equal to X1 v 1 (t) dt. Let us denote this actual utility
The question is: which utility function v 1 (t) should the participant P 1 report in order to maximize his gain u (v 1 , v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n )? We assume that we do not know the utility functions v 2 (t), . . . , v n (t) of other participants. For different v i (t), different selections v 1 (t) may lead to better gain for P 1 .
Decision making under uncertainty: a reminder. The situation of decision making under uncertainty is typical in decision making; see, e.g., [22] . There are several known approaches to solving a general problem of decision making under uncertainty.
We can choose an optimistic approach in which, for each action A, we only consider its most optimistic outcome, with the largest possible gain u + (A) -and choose an action for which this luckiest outcome is the largest.
Alternatively, we can choose a pessimistic approach in which, for each action A, we only consider its most pessimistic outcome, with the smallest possible gain u − (A) -and choose an action for which this worst-case outcome is the largest.
Realistically, both approaches appear to be too extreme. In real life, it is more reasonable to use, as an objective function, a combination of pessimistic and optimistic cases. Such combined pessimism-optimism criterion (originally proposed in [15] ): namely, we choose a real number α ∈ [0, 1], and choose an alternative A for which the combination
takes the largest possible value. Pessimism corresponds to α = 1, optimistic corresponds to α = 0, realistic approaches correspond to α ∈ (0, 1).
Comment. While this combination may sound arbitrary, it is actually the only rule which satisfied reasonable scaleinvariance conditions; see, e.g., [25] , [28] .
For our problem, Hurwicz criterion means that we select a utility function v 1 (t) for which the combination
attains the largest possible value.
For territorial division, it is beneficial to report the correct utilities: result. It turns out that unless we select the optimistic criterion, it is always best to select v 1 (t) = v 1 (t), i.e., to tell the truth. Comment. In the optimistic case, all choices are equivalent.
In such situations, when we have several different alternatives that lead to the same value of the objective function, a natural idea is to use some other criterion to select between these optimal alternatives; see, e.g., [27] . In our case, a natural other criterion is to consider pessimism or Hurwicz pessimismoptimism criterion. In both cases, we come to a conclusion that telling the truth is the best strategy.
Comment. For reader's convenience, the proof of this result is presented in the appendix.
V. HOW TO FIND INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES FROM COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING: INVERSE PROBLEM OF GAME THEORY
Problem. We have mentioned that usually, it is relatively easy to elicit preferences from the participants, and to determine utility values based on these preferences. In some cases, however, we have a subgroup ("clique") of participants who do their best to make joint decisions and who do not want to disclose their differences. This is a frequent situation, e.g., within political groups -who are afraid that any internal differences can be exploited by the competing groups. In such situations, it is extremely difficult to determine individual preferences based on the group decisions.
For example, during the Cold War, this is what kremnlinologists tried to do -with different degrees of success.
In this section, we will show how this determination can be done.
Comment. Decision making and game theory are usually trying, given individual preferences, to find the appropriate group decision. Here, we encounter an inverse problem: given the decisions, we want to reconstruct individual preferences.
Towards an algorithm for solving the inverse problem. Let us assume that we have a group of n participants P 1 , . . . , P n that does not want to reveal their individual preferences. We can, however, ask the group as a whole to compare different preferences; we must use the result of this comparison to determine individual utility functions.
We assume that when making group decision,s the group uses the Nash's solution. Of course, since the Nash's solution depends only on the product of the utility functions, in the best case, we will be able to determine n individual utility functions without knowing which of these functions corresponds to which individual.
Comment. This is OK, because the main objective of our determining these utility functions is to be able to make decision of a larger group based on Nash's solution -and in making this decision, it is irrelevant who has what utility function.
In this sense, our problem is easier than the problem solved by political analysts: from our viewpoint, it is sufficient to know that one member of the ruling clique is more conservative and another is more liberal, but a political analyst would also be interesting in knowing who exactly is conservative and who is more liberal.
We have mentioned that the utility function is determined modulo an arbitrary linear transformation u(A) → a · u(A) + b. Thus, without losing generality, we can assume that the individual utility functions u i (A) are re-scaled in such a way that for the status quo A (0) , we have u i (A (0) ) = 0, and for a pre-selected very favorable outcome A + , we have u i (A + ) = 1.
Let us now select an alternative A and let us show how we can determine the values u 1 (A), . . . , u n (A). For each real number q ∈ [0, 1], we can form a lottery L(q) in which we have A + with probability q and A with probability 1 − q. For this lottery L(q), the individual utility is equal to
therefore, Nash's product is equal to
For the group, the quality of a lottery "A + with probability p, otherwise A (0) " increases with p. When p = 0, this lottery is simply a status quo A (0) , so it is clearly worse than the lottery L(q). For p = 1, this lottery is simply A + , so it is clearly preferable to L(q). Thus, by using the above-describe bisection method, for each q, we can find (with arbitrary accuracy) the value p(q) for which L(q) is equivalent to this lottery.
For this new lottery, the individual utilities are equal to
so Nash's product is equal to p(q) n . Thus, from the fact that the new lottery is equivalent to the L(q), we conclude that the corresponding Nash's products are equal, i.e., that
n . Dividing both sides of this equality by (1−q) n , we conclude
We can repeat this procedure for n different values q = 0, 1/n, 2/n, . . . , (n − 1)/n, and get n different values of the function
This function F (z) is a product of n linear functions with coefficient 1 at z; it is, therefore, a polynomial of n−-th order in terms of the unknown z:
we can thus determine the coefficients a i of this polynomial by solving the corresponding system of n linear equations with n unknowns a i :
Once we have found these coefficients and thus, the polyno-
(z +u i (A)), we can then determine the values −u i (A) as the roots of this polynomial -i.e., the values for which F (−u i (A)) = 0. We can find one of the roots; there exist efficient algorithms for that; see, e.g., [2] . Once we find a root u 1 (A), we can divide the polynomial by z +u 1 (A), and get a new polynomial of order n − 1. We can then use the same algorithm to find the root of the new polynomial, etc., until we find all n roots of the original polynomial F (z).
Thus, we arrive at the following algorithm.
Algorithm for determining individual utility values.
Let us assume that we have a group of n participants. We can ask this group to make joint decisions. Based on these decisions, we want to find the individual utility values u 1 (A), . . . , u n (A) of a given alternative A.
For that, we do the following. For each l from 0 to n − 1, we form the value q l = l/n, and we ask the group to compare the lottery "A + with probability q l , otherwise A" with the lotteries "A + with probability p, otherwise A (0) " for different p. By using bisection, we can find the value p(q l ) for which the lottery "A + with probability q l , otherwise A" is, for this group, equivalent to the lottery "A + with probability p(q l ), otherwise A (0) ". After we find n values p(q l ) (0 ≤ l ≤ n − 1), we solve the system (1) of n linear equations with n unknowns, and get the coefficients a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 . Based on these coefficients, we form a polynomial F (z) = a 0 + a 1 · z + . . . + a n−1 · z n−1 + z n . Then, we apply one of the known factorization algorithms to factorize the resulting polynomial F (z). It factors are z + u i (A), where u i (A) are the desired values.
From individual utility values to individual utility profiles.
From the viewpoint of group decision making, it is sufficient to find out individual utility values u i (A j ) for all alternatives A j . However, from the more general viewpoint of solving the inverse problem, it is desirable to find out the individual utility profiles. For example, if we have two alternatives A j and A k , we want not only to know n values u i (A j ) and n values u i (A k ), we also want to know which value u i (A k ) goes with which value u i (A j ).
For that, we pick a real number α ∈ [0, 1] and repeat the same procedure for the lottery A def = "A j with probability α, otherwise A k ". Thus, we determine n individual utilities u i (A) of this lottery.
For the individual utilities, 
is equal to one of the n values u i (A).
If we select α to be a random value uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], then the probability that
for some wrong p = p is also accidentally equal to one of the n values u i (A) is 0, so this methods leads us to a guaranteed profile.
What if we do not know how many people are in a group?
In some cases, not only we do not know individual preferences, but we also do not know how many people are in a group.
In this case, we can repeat the above procedure for n = 1, 2, . . . until we stop getting a meaningful solution for the corresponding system of linear equations (1); the largest such n is the number of participants.
Uniqueness in precise mathematical terms. Let us describe the uniqueness result in precise mathematical terms.
Definition. Let integers n and m be fixed. The value n will be called number of participants and m will be called number of alternatives.
• By a lottery, we mean a vector p = (
• By an individual utility function, we mean a vector u 1 , . . . , u m of positive numbers.
• By a group utility function, we mean a collection of n utility functions (u i1 , u i2 , . . . , u im ).
• We say that a group utility function u leads to the following preference relation < between the lotteries: p < q if and only if
Comment. Here, the probability p (0) means the probability of the status quo state A (0) , p + means the probability of the outcome A + , and the utilities are scaled in such a way that for each participant, u i (A (0) ) = 0 and u i (A + ) = 1. Our main result is that after this re-scaling, the utility values are uniquely determined by the observed group preferences -of course, modulo possible renaming (permutation) of the participants, because the Nash group decision model does not change if two participants simply swap their utility functions (and their preferences).
Theorem 2.
If two group utility functions u ij and u ij lead to the same preference, then they differ only by permutation, i.e., u ij = u π(i),j for some permutation π of the set {1, . . . , n} of participants.
In other words, modulo permutation of participants, we can uniquely determine the utility values from the group preferences.
The proof of this result is also given in the Appendix.
VI. DESCRIPTION OF ALTRUISM AND PARADOXES OF LOVE
Interdependence of utilities: idea. In the previous text, we implicitly assumed that the utility u i (A j ) of a participant P i depends only on the objective situation, i.e., on the alternative A j . In real-life situations, however, the degree of a person's happiness is determined not only by the objective factorslike what this person gets and what others get -but also by the degree of happiness of other people. Normally, this dependence is positive, i.e., we feel happier if other people are happy. However, negative emotions such as jealousy are also common, when someone else's happiness makes a person not happy.
The idea that a utility of a person depends on utilities of others was first described in [32] , [33] . It was further developed by another future Nobelist Gary Becker; see, e.g., [3] ; see also [5] , [9] , [14] , [38] .
Interdependence of utilities: general description. In general, the utility u i of i-th person under interdependence can be described as
is the utility that does not take interdependence into account, and u j are utilities of other people.
Interdependence of utilities: linear approximation. The effects of interdependence can be illustrated on the example of linear approximation, when we approximate the dependence by the first (linear) terms in its expansion into Taylor series, i.e., when the utility u i of i-th person is equal to
where the interdependence is described by the coefficients a ij .
Paradoxes of love. This simple and seemingly natural model leads to interesting and somewhat paradoxical conclusions; see, e.g., [4] , [6] , [21] .
For example, mutual affection corresponds between persons P 1 and P 2 means that α 12 > 0 and α 21 > 0. In particular, selfless live, when someone else's happiness means more than one's own, corresponds to α 12 > 1.
In general, for two persons, we thus have
Once we know the original utility values u (0) 1 and u (0) 2 , we can solve this system of linear equations and find the resulting values of utility:
As a result, when two people are deeply in love with each other (α 12 > 1 and α 21 > 1), then positive original pleasures u (0) i > 0 lead to u i < 0 -i.e., to unhappiness. This phenomenon may be one of the reasons why people in love often experience deep negative emotions.
From this viewpoint, a situation when one person loves deeply and another rather allows him-or herself to be loved may lead to more happiness than mutual passionate love.
A similar negative consequence of love can also happen in situations like selfless Mother's love when α 12 > 0 may be not so large but α 21 is so large that α 12 · α 21 > 1.
There are also interesting consequences when we try to generalize these results to more than 2 persons. For example, we can define an ideal love, when each person treats other's emotions almost the same way as one's own, i.e., α 12 = α = 1 − ε for a small ε > 0. For two people, from u (0) i > 0, we get u i > 0 -i.e., we can still have happiness. However, if we have three or more people in the state of mutual affection, i.e., if
then in case when everything is fine -e.g., u
i.e., we have unhappiness. This may be the reason why 2-person families are the main form -or, in other words, if two people care about the same person (e.g., his mother and his wife), all there of them are happier if there is some negative feeling (e.g., jealousy) between them.
Comment. It is important to distinguish between emotional interdependence in which one's utility is determined by the utility of other people, and "objective" altruism, in which one's utility depends on the material gain of other people -but not on their subjective utility values, i.e., in which (in the linearized case)
In this approach, when we care about others' well-being and not their emotions, no paradoxes arise, and any degree of altruism only improves the situation; see, e.g, [10] , [11] , [30] . This objective approach to interdependence was proposed and actively used by yet another Nobel Prize winner: Amartya K. Sen; see, e.g., [35] , [36] , [37] .
Another alternative explanation of the paradoxes of love is that there is a time delay ∆t between the emotions of a person and the reaction of the other persons to these emotions. This time delay can be very small, in factions of a second need to process the information, but still, the utility of a person at a moment time t depends not on the utility of others at the very same moment of time, but rather on the utility at some previous moment of time t − ∆t. In this case, even if we have mutual affection, we avoid negative values of utility
